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Abstract. Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on sys-
tems security. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information
leakage is the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information de-
pending on the system execution time. We address the following prob-
lem: given a timed system, synthesize the execution times for which one
cannot deduce whether the system performed some secret behavior. We
solve this problem in the setting of timed automata (TAs). We first pro-
vide a general solution, and then extend the problem to parametric TAs,
by synthesizing internal timings making the TA secure. We study decid-
ability, devise algorithms, and show that our method can also apply to
program analysis.
Keywords: opacity · timed automata · IMITATOR · parameter synthe-
sis.
1 Introduction
Timed systems combine concurrency and possibly hard real-time constraints.
Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on the security of such
systems. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage is
the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on timing
information. In this work, we focus on the execution time, i. e., when a system
works as an almost black-box, with the ability of an attacker to mainly observe
its execution time.
We address the following problem: given a timed system, a private state
denoting the execution of some secret behavior and a final state denoting the
⋆ This is the author (and extended) version of the manuscript of the same name
published in the proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Auto-
mated Technology for Verification and Analysis (ATVA 2019). This version contains
some additional explanations and all proofs. The published version is available at
springer.com. This work is partially supported by the ANR national research pro-
gram PACS (ANR-14-CE28-0002) and by ERATO HASUO Metamathematics for
Systems Design Project (No. JPMJER1603), JST.
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completion of the execution, synthesize the execution times to the final state for
which one cannot deduce whether the system has passed through the private
state. We solve this problem in the setting of timed automata (TAs), which is
a popular extension of finite-state automata with clocks [AD94]. We first prove
that this problem is solvable, and we provide an algorithm, that we implement
and apply to a set of benchmarks containing notably a set of Java programs
known for their (absence of) timing information leakage.
Then we consider a higher-level problem by allowing (internal) timing pa-
rameters in the system, that can model uncertainty or unknown constants at
early design stage. The setting becomes parametric timed automata [AHV93],
and the problem asks: given a timed system with timing parameters, a private
state and a final state, synthesize the timing parameters and the execution times
for which one cannot deduce whether the system has passed through the private
state. Although we show that the problem is in general undecidable, we pro-
vide a decidable subclass; then we devise a general procedure not guaranteed to
terminate, but that behaves well on examples from the literature.
Outline After reviewing related works in Section 2, Section 3 recalls neces-
sary concepts and Section 4 introduces the problem. Section 5 addresses timed-
opacity for timed automata. We then address the parametric version of timed-
opacity, with theory studied in Section 6, algorithmic in Section 7 and experi-
ments in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related works
This work is closely related to the line of work on defining and analyzing infor-
mation flow in timed automata. It is well-known (see e. g., [Koc96; FS00; BB07;
Kot+13; Ben+15a]) that time is a potential attack vector against secure sys-
tems. That is, it is possible that a non-interferent (secure) system can become
interferent (insecure) when timing constraints are added [GMR07]. In [Bar+02;
BT03], a first notion of timed non-interference is proposed. In [GMR07], Gardey
et al. define timed strong non-deterministic non-interference (SNNI) based on
timed language equivalence between the automaton with hidden low-level actions
and the automaton with removed low-level actions. Furthermore, they show that
the problem of determining whether a timed automaton satisfies SNNI is unde-
cidable. In contrast, timed cosimulation-based SNNI, timed bisimulation-based
SNNI and timed state SNNI are decidable. In [Cas09], the problem of checking
opacity for timed automata is considered: even for the restricted class of event-
recording automata [AFH99], it is undecidable whether a system is opaque, i. e.,
whether an attacker can deduce whether some set of actions was performed, by
only observing a given set of observable actions (with their timing). In [VNN18],
Vasilikos et al. define the security of timed automata in term of information
flow using a bisimulation relation and develop an algorithm for deriving a sound
constraint for satisfying the information flow property locally based on relevant
transitions. In [Ben+15a], Benattar et al. study the control synthesis problem
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of timed automata for SNNI. That is, given a timed automaton, they propose
a method to automatically generate a (largest) sub-systems such that it is non-
interferent if possible. Different from the above-mentioned work, our work con-
siders parametric timed automata, i. e., timed systems with unknown design
parameters, and focuses on synthesizing parameter valuations which guarantee
information flow property. As far as we know, this is the first work on paramet-
ric model checking for timed automata for information flow property. Compared
to [Ben+15a], our approach is more realistic as it does not require change of
program structure. Rather, our result provides guidelines on how to choose the
timing parameters (e. g., how long to wait after certain program statements) for
avoiding information leakage.
In [NNV17], the authors propose a type system dealing with non-determinism
and (continuous) real-time, the adequacy of which is ensured using non-
interference. We share the common formalism of TA; however, we mainly focus
on leakage as execution time, and we synthesize internal parts of the system
(clock guards), in contrast to [NNV17] where the system is fixed.
This work is related to work on mitigating information leakage through time
side channel [Aga00; Mol+05; Cop+09; WS17; Wu+18]. In [Aga00], Agat et
al. proposed to eliminate time side channel through type-driven cross-copying.
In [Mol+05], Molnar et al. proposed, along the program counter model, a method
for mitigating side channel through merging branches. A similar idea was pro-
posed in [BRW06]. Coppens et al. [Cop+09] developed a compiler backend for
removing such leaks on x86 processors. In [WS17], Wang et al. proposed to auto-
matically generate masking code for eliminating side channel through program
synthesis. In [Wu+18], Wu et al. proposed to eliminate time side channel through
program repair. Different from the above-mentioned works, we reduce the prob-
lem of mitigating time side channel as a parametric model checking problem and
solve it using parametric reachability analysis techniques.
This work is related to work on identifying information leakage through
timing analysis [SPW18; CR11; Abb+16; Zha+18; DSF16; Doy+13; GWW18].
In [CR11], Chattopadhyay et al. applied model checking to perform cache tim-
ing analysis. In [CJM16], Chu et al. performed similar analysis through sym-
bolic execution. In [Abb+16], Abbasi et al. apply the NuSMV model checker
to verify integrated circuits against information leakage through side channels.
In [Doy+13], a tool is developed to identify time side channel through static
analysis. In [Zha+18], Sung et al. developed a framework based on LLVM for
cache timing analysis.
3 Preliminaries
In this work, we assume a system is modeled in the form of a parametric timed
automaton.
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ℓ0 ℓ2
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x ≥ p2
Fig. 1: A PTA example
3.1 Clocks, parameters and guards
We assume a set X = {x1, . . . , xH} of clocks, i. e., real-valued variables that
evolve at the same rate. A clock valuation is a function µ : X→ R≥0. We write
0 for the clock valuation assigning 0 to all clocks. Given d ∈ R≥0, µ+ d denotes
the valuation s.t. (µ + d)(x) = µ(x) + d, for all x ∈ X. Given R ⊆ X, we define
the reset of a valuation µ, denoted by [µ]R, as follows: [µ]R(x) = 0 if x ∈ R, and
[µ]R(x) = µ(x) otherwise.
We assume a set P = {p1, . . . , pM} of parameters , i. e., unknown constants. A
parameter valuation v is a function v : P→ Q+. We assume ⊲⊳ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}.
A guard g is a constraint over X ∪ P defined by a conjunction of inequalities of
the form x ⊲⊳
∑
1≤i≤M αipi + d, with pi ∈ P, and αi, d ∈ Z. Given g, we
write µ |= v(g) if the expression obtained by replacing each x with µ(x) and
each p with v(p) in g evaluates to true.
3.2 Parametric timed automata
Parametric timed automata (PTA) extend timed automata with parameters
within guards and invariants in place of integer constants [AHV93].
Definition 1 (PTA). A PTA A is a tuple A = (Σ,L, ℓ0,X,P, I, E), where:
1. Σ is a finite set of actions,
2. L is a finite set of locations,
3. ℓ0 ∈ L is the initial location,
4. X is a finite set of clocks,
5. P is a finite set of parameters,
6. I is the invariant, assigning to every ℓ ∈ L a guard I(ℓ),
7. E is a finite set of edges e = (ℓ, g, a, R, ℓ′) where ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ L are the source and
target locations, a ∈ Σ, R ⊆ X is a set of clocks to be reset, and g is a guard.
Example 1. Consider the PTA in Fig. 1 (inspired by [GMR07, Fig. 1b]), contain-
ing one clock x and two parameters p1 and p2. ℓ0 is the initial location, while ℓ1
is the (only) accepting location.
Given a parameter valuation v, we denote by v(A) the non-parametric struc-
ture where all occurrences of a parameter pi have been replaced by v(pi). We
denote as a timed automaton any structure v(A), by assuming a rescaling of the
constants: by multiplying all constants in v(A) by the least common multiple
of their denominators, we obtain an equivalent (integer-valued) TA, as defined
in [AD94].
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Synchronized product of PTAs The synchronous product (using strong
broadcast, i. e., synchronization on a given set of actions), or parallel compo-
sition, of several PTAs gives a PTA.
Definition 2 (synchronized product of PTAs). Let N ∈ N. Given a set of
PTAs Ai = (Σi, Li, (ℓ0)i,Xi,Pi, Ii, Ei), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and a set of actions Σs, the
synchronized product of Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , denoted by A1 ‖Σs A2 ‖Σs · · · ‖Σs AN ,
is the tuple (Σ,L, ℓ0,X,P, I, E), where:
1. Σ =
⋃N
i=1Σi,
2. L =
∏N
i=1 Li,
3. ℓ0 = ((ℓ0)1, . . . , (ℓ0)N ),
4. X =
⋃
1≤i≤N Xi,
5. P =
⋃
1≤i≤N Pi,
6. I((ℓ1, . . . , ℓN )) =
∧N
i=1 Ii(ℓi) for all (ℓ1, . . . , ℓN ) ∈ L,
and E is defined as follows. For all a ∈ Σ, let ζa be the subset of indices i ∈
1, . . . , N such that a ∈ Σi. For all a ∈ Σ, for all (ℓ1, . . . , ℓN) ∈ L, for all
(ℓ′1, . . . , ℓ
′
N) ∈ L,
(
(ℓ1, . . . , ℓN ), g, a, R, (ℓ
′
1, . . . , ℓ
′
N)
) ∈ E if:
– if a ∈ Σs, then
1. for all i ∈ ζa, there exist gi, Ri such that (ℓi, gi, a, Ri, ℓ′i) ∈ Ei, g =∧
i∈ζa
gi, R =
⋃
i∈ζa
Ri, and,
2. for all i 6∈ ζa, ℓ′i = ℓi.
– otherwise (if a /∈ Σs), then there exists i ∈ ζa such that
1. there exist gi, Ri such that (ℓi, gi, a, Ri, ℓ
′
i) ∈ Ei, g = gi, R = Ri, and,
2. for all j 6= i, ℓ′j = ℓj.
That is, synchronization is only performed on Σs, and other actions are
interleaved.
Concrete semantics of TAs Let us now recall the concrete semantics of TA.
Definition 3 (Semantics of a TA). Given a PTA A = (Σ,L, ℓ0,X,P, I, E),
and a parameter valuation v, the semantics of v(A) is given by the timed tran-
sition system (TTS) (S, s0,→), with
– S = {(ℓ, µ) ∈ L× RH≥0 | µ |= v(I(ℓ))},
– s0 = (ℓ0,0),
– → consists of the discrete and (continuous) delay transition relations:
1. discrete transitions: (ℓ, µ)
e7→ (ℓ′, µ′), if (ℓ, µ), (ℓ′, µ′) ∈ S, and there
exists e = (ℓ, g, a, R, ℓ′) ∈ E, such that µ′ = [µ]R, and µ |= v(g).
2. delay transitions: (ℓ, µ)
d7→ (ℓ, µ+ d), with d ∈ R≥0, if ∀d′ ∈ [0, d], (ℓ, µ+
d′) ∈ S.
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Moreover we write (ℓ, µ)
(e,d)−→ (ℓ′, µ′) for a combination of a delay and discrete
transition if ∃µ′′ : (ℓ, µ) d7→ (ℓ, µ′′) e7→ (ℓ′, µ′).
Given a TA v(A) with concrete semantics (S, s0,→), we refer to the states
of S as the concrete states of v(A). A run of v(A) is an alternating sequence of
concrete states of v(A) and pairs of edges and delays starting from the initial
state s0 of the form s0, (e0, d0), s1, · · · with i = 0, 1, . . . , ei ∈ E, di ∈ R≥0
and si
(ei,di)−→ si+1. The duration of a finite run ρ : s0, (e0, d0), s1, · · · , si is
dur(ρ) =
∑
0≤j≤i−1 dj . Given a state s = (ℓ, µ), we say that s is reachable
in v(A) if s appears in a run of v(A). By extension, we say that ℓ is reachable;
and by extension again, given a set T of locations, we say that T is reachable
if there exists ℓ ∈ T such that ℓ is reachable in v(A). Given ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ L and
a run ρ, we say that ℓ is reachable on the way to ℓ′ in ρ if ρ is of the form
(ℓ0), (e0, d0), · · · , (en, dn), · · · (em, dm) · · · for some m,n ∈ N such that ℓn = ℓ,
ℓm = ℓ
′ and ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, ℓi 6= ℓ′. Conversely, ℓ is unreachable on the way
to ℓ′ in ρ if ρ is of the form (ℓ0), (e0, d0), · · · , (em, dm) · · · with ℓm = ℓ′ and
∀0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, ℓi 6= ℓ.
Example 2. Consider again the PTAA in Fig. 1, and let v be such that v(p1) = 1
and v(p2) = 2. Consider the following run ρ of v(A): (ℓ0, x = 0), (e2, 1.4), (ℓ2, x =
1.4), (e3, 1.3), (ℓ1, x = 2.7), where e2 is the edge from ℓ0 to ℓ2 in Fig. 1, and e3 is
the edge from ℓ2 to ℓ1. We write “x = 1.4” instead of “µ such that µ(x) = 1.4”.
We have dur(ρ) = 1.4 + 1.3 = 2.7. In addition, ℓ2 is reachable on the way to ℓ1
in ρ.
3.3 Symbolic semantics
Let us now recall the symbolic semantics of PTAs (see e. g., [Hun+02]).
Constraints We first need to define operations on constraints. A linear term over
X ∪ P is of the form ∑1≤i≤H αixi +
∑
1≤j≤M βjpj + d, with xi ∈ X, pj ∈ P,
and αi, βj , d ∈ Z. A constraint C (i. e., a convex polyhedron) over X ∪ P is a
conjunction of inequalities of the form lt ⊲⊳ 0, where lt is a linear term.
Given a parameter valuation v, v(C) denotes the constraint over X obtained
by replacing each parameter p in C with v(p). Likewise, given a clock valua-
tion µ, µ(v(C)) denotes the expression obtained by replacing each clock x in v(C)
with µ(x). We say that v satisfies C, denoted by v |= C, if the set of clock valu-
ations satisfying v(C) is nonempty. Given a parameter valuation v and a clock
valuation µ, we denote by µ|v the valuation over X ∪ P such that for all clocks
x, µ|v(x) = µ(x) and for all parameters p, µ|v(p) = v(p). We use the notation
µ|v |= C to indicate that µ(v(C)) evaluates to true. We say that C is satisfiable
if ∃µ, v s.t. µ|v |= C.
We define the time elapsing of C, denoted by Cր, as the constraint over X
and P obtained from C by delaying all clocks by an arbitrary amount of time.
That is,
µ′|v |= Cր iff ∃µ : X→ R+, ∃d ∈ R+ s.t. µ|v |= C ∧ µ′ = µ+ d.
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s0 s2
s1 s3
e1
e2
e3
Fig. 2: Parametric zone graph of Fig. 1
Given R ⊆ X, we define the reset of C, denoted by [C]R, as the constraint
obtained from C by resetting the clocks in R, and keeping the other clocks
unchanged. We denote by C↓P the projection of C onto P, i. e., obtained by
eliminating the variables not in P (e. g., using Fourier-Motzkin [Sch99]).
Definition 4 (Symbolic state). A symbolic state is a pair (ℓ, C) where ℓ ∈ L
is a location, and C its associated parametric zone.
Definition 5 (Symbolic semantics). Given a PTA A = (Σ,L, ℓ0,X,P, I, E),
the symbolic semantics of A is the labeled transition system called parametric
zone graph PZG = (E,S, s0,⇒), with
– S = {(ℓ, C) | C ⊆ I(ℓ)},
– s0 =
(
ℓ0, (
∧
1≤i≤H xi = 0)
ր ∧ I(ℓ0)
)
, and
–
(
(ℓ, C), e, (ℓ′, C′)
) ∈ ⇒ if e = (ℓ, g, a, R, ℓ′) ∈ E and
C′ =
(
[(C ∧ g)]R ∧ I(ℓ′)
)ր ∧ I(ℓ′)
with C′ satisfiable.
That is, in the parametric zone graph, nodes are symbolic states, and arcs
are labeled by edges of the original PTA.
If
(
(ℓ, C), e, (ℓ′, C′)
) ∈ ⇒, we write Succ(s, e) = (ℓ′, C′). By extension, we
write Succ(s) for ∪e∈ESucc(s, e).
Example 3. Consider again the PTA A in Fig. 1. The parametric zone graph
of A is given in Fig. 2, where e1 is the edge from ℓ0 to ℓ1 in Fig. 1, e2 is the edge
from ℓ0 to ℓ2, and e3 is the edge from ℓ2 to ℓ1. In addition, the symbolic states
are:
s0 = ( ℓ0 , 0 ≤ x ≤ 3 ∧ p1 ≥ 0 ∧ p2 ≥ 0 )
s1 = ( ℓ1 , x ≥ p2 ∧ 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 3 ∧ p1 ≥ 0 )
s2 = ( ℓ2 , 3 ≥ x ≥ p1 ∧ 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 3 ∧ p2 ≥ 0 )
s3 = ( ℓ1 , x ≥ p1 ∧ 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 3 ∧ p2 ≥ 0 ) .
3.4 Reachability synthesis
We will use reachability synthesis to solve the problems in Section 4. This pro-
cedure, called EFsynth, takes as input a PTA A and a set of target locations T ,
and attempts to synthesize all parameter valuations v for which T is reachable
in v(A). EFsynth(A, T ) was formalized in e. g., [JLR15] and is a procedure that
may not terminate, but that computes an exact result (sound and complete) if
it terminates. EFsynth traverses the parametric zone graph of A.
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ℓ1 ℓ2 ℓ3
error
ℓ4 ℓpriv
ℓ5
ℓf
cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ
cl ≤ ǫ
setupserver
cl := 0
cl ≤ ǫ
read?x
cl := 0
cl ≤ ǫ
x < 0
cl ≤ ǫ
x ≥ 0
cl := 0
x ≤ secret
∧ cl ≤ ǫ
cl := 0
x > secret
∧ cl ≤ ǫ
cl := 0
322 ≤ cl
∧ cl ≤ 322 + ǫ
p× 322 ≤ cl
∧ cl ≤ p× 322 + ǫ
Fig. 3: A Java program encoded in a PTA
Example 4. Consider again the PTA A in Fig. 1. EFsynth(A, {ℓ1}) = p1 ≤ 3 ∨
p2 ≤ 3. Intuitively, it corresponds to all parameter constraints in the parametric
zone graph in Fig. 2 associated to symbolic states with location ℓ1.
We finally recall the correctness of EFsynth.
Lemma 1 ([JLR15]). Let A be a PTA, and let T be a subset of the locations
of A. Assume EFsynth(A, T ) terminates with result K. Then v |= K iff T is
reachable in v(A).
4 Timed-opacity problems
Let us first introduce two key concepts to define our notion of opacity.
DReach
v(A)
ℓ (ℓ
′) (resp. DReach
v(A)
¬ℓ (ℓ
′)) is the set of the durations of the runs
for which ℓ is reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓ′. Formally:
DReach
v(A)
ℓ (ℓ
′) = {d | ∃ρ in v(A) such that d = dur(ρ) ∧ ℓ is reachable on the
way to ℓ′ in ρ} and DReachv(A)¬ℓ (ℓ′) = {d | ∃ρ in v(A) such that d = dur(ρ) ∧ ℓ
is unreachable on the way to ℓ′ in ρ}.
Example 5. Consider again the PTA in Fig. 1, and let v be such that v(p1) = 1
and v(p2) = 2. We have DReach
v(A)
ℓ2
(ℓ1) = [1, 3] and DReach
v(A)
¬ℓ2
(ℓ1) = [2, 3].
Definition 6 (timed opacity w.r.t. D). Given a TA v(A), a private lo-
cation ℓpriv , a target location ℓf and a set of execution times D, we say
that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for execution times D if
D ⊆ DReachv(A)ℓpriv (ℓf ) ∩DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ).
Example 6. Consider the PTA A in Fig. 3 where cl is a clock, while ǫ, p are pa-
rameters. We use a sightly extended PTA syntax: read?x reads the value input
on a given channel read, and assigns it to a (discrete, global) variable x. secret
is a constant variable of arbitrary value. If both x and secret are finite-domain
variables (e. g., bounded integers) then they can be seen as syntactic sugar for lo-
cations. Such variables are supported by most model checkers, including Uppaal
and IMITATOR.
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This PTA encodes a server process from the DARPA Space/Time Analysis
for Cybersecurity (STAC) library1, that compares a user-input variable with
a given secret and performs different actions taking different times depending
on this secret.The Java code is given in Appendix A. In our encoding, a single
instruction takes a time in [0, ǫ], while p is a (parametric) factor to one of the
sleep instructions of the program (originally, v(p) = 2). For sake of simplicity,
we abstract away instructions not related to time, and merge subfunctions calls.
Fix v(ǫ) = 1, v(p) = 2. For this example, DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) = [1024, 1029]
while DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) = [2048, 2053]. Therefore, v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on
the way to ℓf for execution times D = [1024, 1029]∩ [2048, 2053] = ∅.
Now fix v(ǫ) = 2, v(p) = 1.002. DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) = [1024, 1034] while
DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) = [1026.048, 1036.048]. Therefore, v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv
on the way to ℓf for execution times D = [1026.048, 1034].
4.1 Computation problems
We can now define the timed-opacity computation problem, which consists in
computing the possible execution times ensuring opacity w.r.t. a private location.
In other words, the attacker model is as follows: the attacker has only access to
the computation time between the start of the program and the time it reaches
a given (final) location.
Timed-opacity Computation Problem:
Input: A TA v(A), a private location ℓpriv , a target location ℓf
Problem: Compute the execution times D for which v(A) is opaque w.r.t.
ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for execution times D
The synthesis counterpart allows for a higher-level problem by also synthe-
sizing the internal timings guaranteeing opacity.
Timed-opacity Synthesis Problem:
Input: A PTA A, a private location ℓpriv , a target location ℓf
Problem: Synthesize the parameter valuations v and the execution times D
for which v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for execution times D
Note that the execution times can depend on the parameter valuations.
5 Timed-opacity computation for timed automata
5.1 Answering the timed-opacity computation problem
Proposition 1 (timed-opacity computation). The timed-opacity computa-
tion problem is solvable for TAs.
1 https://github.com/Apogee-Research/STAC/blob/master/Canonical_Examples/Source/Category1_vulnerable.java
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Proof. Let A be a TA. We aim at exhibiting the execution times D for which A
is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for D. We show in the following that this
can be obtained from the region graph, the construction of which is EXPSPACE
for timed automata [AD94].
We modify the TA as follows. First, let us add a new clock xabs , which is
never reset in the TA. Second, we add a Boolean discrete variable b, initially
false. Recall that discrete variables over a finite domain are syntactic sugar for
locations : therefore, ℓf with b = false and ℓf with b = true can be seen as two
different locations. Then, we set b := true on any transition leading to ℓpriv ;
therefore, b = true denotes that ℓpriv has been visited.
We can now compute DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) and DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) from the region
graph of this modified TA, i. e., values of xabs reaching ℓf with b = false (resp.
b = true), as follows. For each region the discrete part of which is ℓf with b = false
(resp. b = true), gather the clock constraints; they come in the form of an integer
part, and constraints on the fractional parts of the form xi − xj ∼ c or xi ∼ c
or −xi ∼ c for ∼ ∈ {<,≤} and c ∈ N. We then apply variable elimination by
existential quantification to keep only constraints over xabs and obtain the set
of (integer and fractional) valuations of xabs such that ℓf with b = false (resp.
b = true) is reachable. Recall that, from the region graph semantics [AD94], the
integer part can take a finite number of values, thanks to the use of an extrapo-
lation (in its simplest form, all integer values below k must be enumerated, while
values above k are in the same equivalence class—where k is the largest integer
constant of the TA). This gives a finite graph, and therefore the values of xabs
reaching ℓf with b = false (resp. b = true) can be represented as a finite set of
(possibly punctual) intervals.
After computing DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) and DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ), we can directly apply
Definition 6: we perform the intersection of the valuations of xabs for which ℓf
with b = false is reachable together with these for which ℓf with b = true is
reachable, which gives the maximum set of execution times D for which v(A) is
opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for execution times D.
Finally note that, while correct in theory, our construction could be largely
improved in practice with the zone graph construction with appropriate extrap-
olations (e. g., [Beh+06; HSW16]). Also note that our practical method will be
different from this proof, reducing to reachability in a parametric model.
This positive result can be put in perspective with the negative result
of [Cas09], that proves that it is undecidable whether a TA (and even the more
restricted subclass of event-recording automata [AFH99]) is opaque, in a sense
that the attacker can deduce some actions, by looking at observable actions to-
gether with their timing. The difference in our setting is that only the global
time is observable, which can be seen as a single action, occurring once only at
the end of the computation. In other words, our attacker is less powerful than
the attacker in [Cas09].
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5.2 Checking for timed-opacity
If one does not have the ability to tune the system (i. e., change internal delays,
or add some sleep() or Wait() statements in the program), one may be first
interested in knowing whether the system is opaque for all execution times.
Definition 7 (timed opacity). Given a TA v(A), a private location ℓpriv and
a target location ℓf , we say that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf if
DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) = DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ).
That is, a system is opaque if, for any execution time d, a run of duration d
reaches ℓf after passing by ℓpriv iff another run of duration d reaches ℓf without
passing by ℓpriv .
Remark 1. This definition is symmetric: a system is not opaque iff an attacker
can deduce ℓpriv or ¬ℓpriv . For instance, if there is no path through ℓpriv to ℓf ,
but a path to ℓf , a system is not opaque w.r.t. Definition 7.
As we have a procedure to compute DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) and DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ),
(see Proposition 1), Definition 7 gives an immediate procedure to decide timed
opacity. Note that, from the finiteness of the region graph, DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) and
DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) come in the form of a finite union of intervals, and their equality
can be effectively computed.
Example 7. Consider again the PTAA in Fig. 1, and let v be such that v(p1) = 1
and v(p2) = 2. Recall from Example 5 that DReach
v(A)
ℓ2
(ℓ1) = [1, 3] and
DReach
v(A)
¬ℓ2
(ℓ1) = [2, 3]. Thus, DReach
v(A)
ℓ2
(ℓ1) 6= DReachv(A)¬ℓ2 (ℓ1) and therefore
v(A) is not opaque w.r.t. ℓ2 on the way to ℓ1.
Now, consider v′ such that v′(p1) = v
′(p2) = 1.5. This time,
DReach
v′(A)
ℓ2
(ℓ1) = DReach
v′(A)
¬ℓ2
(ℓ1) = [1.5, 3] and therefore v
′(A) is opaque
w.r.t. ℓ2 on the way to ℓ1.
6 Decidability and undecidability
We address here the following decision problem, that asks about the emptiness
of the parameter valuations and execution times set guaranteeing timed opacity.
Timed-opacity Emptiness Problem:
Input: A PTA A, a private location ℓpriv , a target location ℓf
Problem: Is the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on
the way to ℓf for a non-empty set of execution times empty?
Dually, we are interested in deciding whether there exists at least one pa-
rameter valuation for which v(A) is opaque for at least some execution time.
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6.1 Undecidability in general
With the rule of thumb that all non-trivial decision problems are undecidable
for general PTAs [And19], the following result is not surprising, and follows from
the undecidability of reachability-emptiness for PTAs.
Proposition 2 (undecidability). The timed-opacity emptiness problem is un-
decidable for general PTAs.
Proof. We reduce from the reachability-emptiness problem, i. e., the existence
of a parameter valuation reaching a given location in a PTA, which is undecid-
able [AHV93; Mil00; Doy07; JLR15; Ben+15b]. Consider an arbitrary PTA A
with initial location ℓ0 and a given location ℓf . It is undecidable whether there
exists a parameter valuation for which there exists a run reaching ℓf . (Proofs
of undecidability in the literature generally reduce from the halting problem of
a 2-counter machine, so one can see A as an encoding of a 2-counter machine.)
Now, add the following locations and transitions (all unguarded) as in Fig. 4:
a new urgent2 initial location ℓ′0 with outgoing transitions to ℓ0 and to a new
location ℓpub ; a new urgent location ℓpriv with an incoming transition from ℓf ;
a new final location ℓ′f with incoming transitions from ℓpriv and ℓpub. Also, ℓf is
made urgent. Let A′ denote this new PTA.
First note that, due to the unguarded transitions, ℓ′f is reachable for any
parameter valuation and for any execution time by runs passing by ℓpub and not
passing by ℓpriv . That is, for all v, DReach
v(A′)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓ′f) = [0,∞).
Assume there exists some parameter valuation v such that ℓf is reachable
from ℓ0 in v(A) for some execution times D: then, due to our construction with
additional urgent locations, ℓpriv is reachable on the way to ℓ
′
f in v(A′) for the
exact same execution times D. Therefore, v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way
to ℓ′f for execution times D.
Conversely, if ℓf is not reachable from ℓ0 in A for any valuation, then ℓpriv
is not reachable on the way to ℓ′f for any valuation in A′. Therefore, there is
no valuation v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓ′f for any
execution time. Therefore, there exists a valuation v such that v(A) is opaque
w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓ
′
f iff ℓf is reachable in A—which is undecidable.
6.2 A decidable subclass
We now show that the timed-opacity emptiness problem is decidable for the
subclass of PTAs called L/U-PTAs [Hun+02]. Despite early positive results for
L/U-PTAs [Hun+02; BL09], more recent results (notably [JLR15; AM15; AL17;
ALR18]) mostly proved undecidable properties of L/U-PTAs, and therefore this
positive result is welcome.
2 Where time cannot elapse (depicted in dotted yellow in our figures).
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ℓ0 ℓfAℓ′0 ℓpriv
ℓpub ℓ
′
f
Fig. 4: Reduction from reachability-emptiness
Syntax of L/U-PTAs
Definition 8 (L/U-PTA). An L/U-PTA is a PTA where the set of parameters
is partitioned into lower-bound parameters and upper-bound parameters, where
each upper-bound (resp. lower-bound) parameter pi must be such that, for every
guard or invariant constraint x ⊲⊳
∑
1≤i≤M αipi + d, we have: αi > 0 implies
⊲⊳ ∈ {≤, <} (resp. ⊲⊳ ∈ {≥, >}).
Example 8. The PTA in Fig. 1 is an L/U-PTA with {p1, p2} as lower-bound
parameters, and ∅ as upper-bound parameters.
The PTA in Fig. 3 is not an L/U-PTA, because p is compared to cl both as
a lower-bound (in “p× 322 ≤ cl”) and as an upper-bound (“cl ≤ p× 322 + ǫ”).
Theorem 1 (decidability). The timed-opacity emptiness problem is decidable
for L/U-PTAs.
Proof. We reduce to the timed-opacity computation problem of a given TA,
which is decidable (Proposition 1).
Let A be an L/U-PTA. Let A0,∞ denote the structure obtained as follows:
any occurrence of a lower-bound parameter is replaced with 0, and any occur-
rence of a conjunct x ⊳ p (where p is necessarily a upper-bound parameter) is
deleted, i. e., replaced with true.
Let us show that the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv
on the way to ℓf for a non-empty set of execution times is non empty iff the
solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A0,∞ is non-empty.
⇒ Assume there exists a valuation v such that v(A) is opaque w.r.t. ℓpriv on
the way to ℓf for a non-empty set of execution. Therefore, the solution to the
timed-opacity computation problem for A0,∞ is non-empty. That is, there
exists a duration d such that there exists a run of duration d such that ℓpriv
is reachable on the way to ℓf , and there exists a run of duration d such that
ℓpriv is unreachable on the way to ℓf .
We now need the following monotonicity property of L/U-PTAs:
Lemma 2 ([Hun+02]). Let A be an L/U-PTA and v be a parameter val-
uation. Let v′ be a valuation such that for each upper-bound parameter p+,
v′(p+) ≥ v(p+) and for each lower-bound parameter p−, v′(p−) ≤ v(p−).
Then any run of v(A) is a run of v′(A).
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Therefore, from Lemma 2, the runs of v(A) of duration d such that ℓpriv is
reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓf are also runs of A0,∞. There-
fore, there exists a non-empty set of durations such that A0,∞ is opaque, i. e.,
solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A0,∞ is non-empty.
⇐ Assume the solution to the timed-opacity computation problem for A0,∞ is
non-empty. That is, there exists a duration d such that there exists a run of
duration d such that ℓpriv is reachable on the way to ℓf in A0,∞, and there
exists a run of duration d such that ℓpriv is unreachable on the way to ℓf
in A0,∞.
The result could follow immediately—if only assigning 0 and ∞ to parame-
ters was a proper parameter valuation. From [Hun+02; BL09], if a location
is reachable in the TA obtained by valuating lower-bound parameters with 0
and upper-bound parameters with ∞, then there exists a sufficiently large
constant C such that this run exists in v(A) such that v assigns 0 to lower-
bound and C to upper-bound parameters. Here, we can trivially pick d, as
any clock constraint x ≤ d will be satisfied for a run of duration d. Let v as-
sign 0 to lower-bound and d to upper-bound parameters. Then, there exists
a run of duration d such that ℓpriv is reachable on the way to ℓf in v(A), and
there exists a run of duration d such that ℓpriv is unreachable on the way
to ℓf in v(A). Therefore, the set of valuations v such that v(A) is opaque
w.r.t. ℓpriv on the way to ℓf for a non-empty set of execution times is non
empty—which concludes the proof.
Remark 2. The class of L/U-PTAs is known to be relatively meaningful, and
many case studies from the literature fit into this class, including case studies
proposed even before this class was defined in [Hun+02]. Even though the PTA
in Fig. 3 does not fit in this class, it can easily be transformed into an L/U-PTA,
by duplicating p into pl (used in lower-bound comparisons with clocks) and pu
(used in upper-bound comparisons with clocks).
7 Parameter synthesis for opacity
Despite the negative theoretical result of Proposition 2, we now address the
timed-opacity synthesis problem for the full class of PTAs. Our method may not
terminate (due to the undecidability) but, if it does, its result is correct. Our
workflow can be summarized as follows.
1. We enrich the original PTA by adding a Boolean flag b and a final synchro-
nization action;
2. We perform self-composition (i. e., parallel composition with a copy of itself)
of this modified PTA;
3. We perform reachability-synthesis using EFsynth on ℓf with contradictory
values of b.
We detail each operation in the following.
In this section, we assume a PTA A, a given private location ℓpriv and a
given final location ℓf .
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ℓ1 ℓ2 ℓ3
error
ℓ4 ℓpriv
ℓ5
ℓf
cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ cl ≤ ǫ
cl ≤ ǫ
setupserver
cl := 0
cl ≤ ǫ
read?x
cl := 0
cl ≤ ǫ
x < 0
cl ≤ ǫ
x ≥ 0
cl := 0
x ≤ secret
∧ cl ≤ ǫ
cl := 0
b := true
x > secret
∧ cl ≤ ǫ
cl := 0
322 ≤ cl
∧ cl ≤ 322 + ǫ
∧ xabs = pabs
finish
p× 322 ≤ cl
∧ cl ≤ p× 322 + ǫ
∧ xabs = pabs
finish
Fig. 5: Transformed version of Fig. 3
Enriching the PTA We first add a Boolean flag b initially set to false, and
then set to true on any transition leading to ℓpriv (in the line of the proof of
Proposition 1). Therefore, b = true denotes that ℓpriv has been visited. Second,
we add a synchronization action finish on any transition leading to ℓf . Third,
we add a new clock xabs (never reset) together with a new parameter pabs , and
we guard all transitions to ℓf with xabs = pabs . This will allow to measure the
(parametric) execution time. Let Enrich(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) denote this procedure.
Example 9. Fig. 5 shows the transformed version of the PTA in Fig. 3.
Self-composition We use here the principle of self-composition, i. e., com-
posing the PTA with a copy of itself. More precisely, given a PTA A′ =
Enrich(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ), we first perform an identical copy of A′ with distinct vari-
ables : that is, a clock x of A′ is distinct from a clock x in the copy of A′—which
can be trivially performed using variable renaming.3 Let Copy(A′) denote this
copy of A′. We then compute A′ ‖{finish} Copy(A′). That is, A′ and Copy(A′)
evolve completely independently due to the interleaving—except that they are
forced to enter ℓf at the same time, thanks to the synchronization action finish.
Synthesis Then, we apply reachability synthesis EFsynth (over all parameters,
i. e., the “internal” timing parameters, but also the pabs parameter) to the follow-
ing goal location: the original A′ is in ℓf with b = true while its copy Copy(A′)
is in ℓ′f with b
′ = false (primed variables denote variables from the copy). In-
tuitively, we synthesize timing parameters and execution times such that there
exists a run reaching ℓf with b = true (i. e., that has visited ℓpriv ) and there
exists another run of same duration reaching ℓf with b = false (i. e., that has not
visited ℓpriv ).
Let SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) denote the entire procedure. We formalize SynthOp
in Algorithm 1, where “ℓf ∧ b = true” denotes the location ℓf with b = true.
3 In fact, the fresh clock xabs and parameter pabs can be shared to save two variables,
as xabs is never reset, and both PTAs enter ℓf at the same time, therefore both
“copies” of xabs and pabs always share the same values.
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Algorithm 1: SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf)
input : A PTA A, locations ℓpriv , ℓf
output : Constraint K over the parameters
1 A′ ← Enrich(A, ℓpriv , ℓf )
2 A′′ ← A′ ‖{finish} Copy(A′)
3 return EFsynth
(
A′′,{(ℓf ∧ b = true, ℓ′f ∧ b′ = false)
})
Also note that EFsynth is called on a set made of a single location of A′ ‖{finish}
Copy(A′); by definition of the synchronous product, this location is a pair of
locations, one from A′ (i. e., “ℓf ∧ b = true”) and one from Copy(A′) (i. e.,
“ℓ′f ∧ b′ = false”).
Example 10. Consider again the PTA A in Fig. 3: its enriched version A′ is
given in Fig. 5. Fix v(ǫ) = 1, v(p) = 2. We then perform the synthesis applied to
the self-composition of A′ according to Algorithm 1. The result obtained with
IMITATOR is: pabs = ∅ (as expected from Example 6).
Now fix v(ǫ) = 2, v(p) = 1.002. We obtain: pabs ∈ [1026.048, 1034] (again, as
expected from Example 6).
Now let us keep all parameters unconstrained. The result of Algorithm 1 is
the following 3-dimensional constraint:
5× ǫ+ 1024 ≥ pabs ≥ 1024
∧ 1024× p + 5× ǫ ≥ pabs ≥ 1024× p ≥ 0
Soundness We will state below that, whenever SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) termi-
nates, then its result is an exact (sound and complete) answer to the timed-
opacity synthesis problem.
Let us first prove a technical lemma used later to prove our the soundness of
SynthOp.
Lemma 3. Assume SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) terminates with result K. For all v |=
K, there exists a run ending in ℓf at time v(pabs) in v(A).
Proof. From the construction of Enrich, we added a new clock xabs (never reset)
together with a new parameter pabs , and we guarded all transitions to ℓf with
xabs = pabs . Therefore, valuations of pabs correspond exactly to the times at
which ℓf can be reached in v(A).
We can now prove soundness and completeness.
Proposition 3 (soundness). Assume SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf) terminates with
result K. For all v |= K, there exists a run of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv
is reachable on the way to ℓf in v(A) and there exists a run of duration v(pabs)
such that ℓpriv is unreachable on the way to ℓf in v(A).
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Proof. SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) is the result of EFsynth called on the self-
composition of Enrich(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ). Recall that Enrich has enriched A with the
addition of a guard xabs = pabs on the incoming transitions of ℓf , as well as a
Boolean flag b that is true iff ℓpriv was visited along a run. Assume v |= K. From
Lemma 1, there exists a run of A′′ reaching ℓf ∧ b = true, ℓ′f ∧ b′ = false. From
Lemma 3, this run takes v(pabs) time units. From the self-composition that is
made of interleaving only (except for the final synchronization), there exists a
run of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is reachable on the way to ℓf in v(A) and
there exists a run of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is unreachable on the way
to ℓf in v(A).
Proposition 4 (completeness). Assume SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf) terminates
with result K. Assume v. Assume there exists a run of duration v(pabs) such
that ℓpriv is reachable on the way to ℓf in v(A) and there exists a run of du-
ration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is unreachable on the way to ℓf in v(A). Then
v |= K.
Proof. Assume SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf ) terminates with result K. Assume v. As-
sume there exists a run ρ of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is reachable on the
way to ℓf in v(A) and there exists a run ρ′ of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is
unreachable on the way to ℓf in v(A).
First, from Enrich, there exists a run ρ of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is
reachable (resp. unreachable) on the way to ℓf in v(A) implies that there exists
a run ρ of duration v(pabs) such that ℓf ∧ b = true (resp. b = false) is reachable
in v(Enrich(A)).
Since our self-composition allows any interleaving, runs ρ of v(A′) and ρ′
in v(Copy(A′)) are independent—except for reaching ℓf . Since ρ and ρ′ have
the same duration v(pabs), then they both reach ℓf at the same time and, from
our definition of self-composition, they can simultaneously fire action finish and
enter ℓf at time v(pabs). Hence, there exists a run reaching ℓf ∧b = true, ℓ′f ∧b′ =
false in v(A′′).
Finally, from Lemma 1, v |= K.
Theorem 2 (correctness). Assume SynthOp(A, ℓpriv , ℓf) terminates with re-
sult K. Assume v. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a run of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is reachable on the way
to ℓf in v(A) and there exists a run of duration v(pabs) such that ℓpriv is
unreachable on the way to ℓf in v(A).
2. v |= K.
Proof. From Propositions 3 and 4
8 Experiments
8.1 Experimental environment
We use IMITATOR [And+12], a tool taking as input networks of PTAs ex-
tended with several handful features such as shared global discrete variables,
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PTA synchronization through strong broadcast, etc. IMITATOR represents sym-
bolic states as polyhedra, relying on PPL [BHZ08].
We ran experiments using IMITATOR 2.10.4 “Butter Jellyfish” (build 2477
HEAD/5b53333) on a Dell XPS 13 9360 equipped with an Intel R© CoreTM i7-
7500U CPU @ 2.70GHz with 8GiB memory running Linux Mint 18.3 64 bits.4
8.2 Translating programs into PTAs
We will consider case studies from the PTA community and from previous works
focusing on privacy using (parametric) timed automata. In addition, we will be
interested in analyzing programs too. In order to apply our method to the analy-
sis of programs, we need a systematic way of translating a program (e. g., a Java
program) into a PTA. In general, precisely modeling the execution time of a pro-
gram using models like timed automata is highly non-trivial due to complication
of hardware pipelining, caching, OS scheduling, etc. The readers are referred to
the rich literature in, for instance, [Lv+10]. In this work, we instead make the
following simplistic assumption on execution time of a program statement and
focus on solving the parameter synthesis problem. How to precisely model the
execution time of programs is orthogonal and complementary to our work.
We assume that the execution time of a program statement other than
Thread.sleep(n) is within a range [0, ǫ] where ǫ is a small integer constant
(in milliseconds), whereas the execution time of statement Thread.sleep(n) is
within a range [n, n+ ǫ]. In fact, we choose to keep ǫ parametric to be as general
as possible, and to not depend on particular architectures.
Our test subject is a set of benchmark programs from the DARPA Space/-
Time Analysis for Cybersecurity (STAC) program.5 These programs are being
released publicly to facilitate researchers to develop methods and tools for iden-
tifying STAC vulnerabilities in the programs.
8.3 A richer framework
The symbolic representation of variables and parameters in IMITATOR allows us
to reason symbolically concerning variables. That is, instead of enumerating all
possible (bounded) values of x and secret in Fig. 3, we turn them to parameters
(i. e., unknown constants), and IMITATOR performs a symbolic reasoning. Even
better, the analysis terminates for this example even when no bound is provided
on these variables. This is often not possible in (non-parametric) timed automata
based model checkers, that usually have to enumerate these values. Therefore,
in our PTA representation of Java programs, we turn all user-input variable and
secret constant variables to parameters. Other local variables are implemented
using IMITATOR discrete (shared, global) variables.
We also discuss how to enlarge the scope of our framework.
4 Sources, models and results are available at imitator.fr/static/ATVA19/.
5 https://github.com/Apogee-Research/STAC/
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ℓ1 ℓ2
h > 0
cl > 30
h ≤ 0
Fig. 6: [VNN18, Fig. 5]
Multiple private locations This can be easily achieved by setting b to true along
any incoming transition of one of these private locations.
Multiple final locations The technique used depends on whether these multiple
final locations can be distinguished or not. If they are indistinguishable (i. e.,
the observer knows when the program has terminated, but not in which state),
then it suffices to merge all these final locations in a single one, and our frame-
work trivially applies. If they are distinguishable, then one analysis needs to be
conducted on each of these locations (with a different parameter pabs for each
of these), and the obtained constraints must be intersected.
Access to high-level variables In the literature, a distinction is sometimes made
between low-level (“public”) and high-level (“private”) variables. Opacity or
non-interference can be defined in terms of the ability for an observer to deduce
some information on the high-level variables.
Example 11. For example, in Fig. 6 (where cl is a clock and h a variable), if ℓ2
is reachable in 20 time units, then it is clear that the value of the high-level
variable h is negative.
Our framework can also be used to address this problem, e. g., by setting b
to true, not on locations but on selected tests / assignments of such variables.
Example 12. For example, setting b to true on the upper transition from ℓ1 to ℓ2
in Fig. 6, the answer to the timed-opacity computation problem is D = (30,∞),
and the system is therefore not opaque since ℓ2 can be reached for any execution
time in [0,∞).
8.4 Experiments
Benchmarks As a proof of concept, we applied our method to a set of examples
from the literature. The first five models come from previous works from the lit-
erature [GMR07; Ben+15a; VNN18], also addressing non-interference or opacity
in timed automata.6 In addition, we used two common models from the (P)TA
6 As most previous works on opacity and timed automata do not come with an imple-
mentation nor with benchmarks, it is not easy to find larger models coming in the
form of TAs.
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literature, not necessarily linked to security: a toy coffee machine (Coffee) used
as benchmark in a number of papers, and a model Fischer’s mutual exclusion
protocol (Fischer-HRSV02) [Hun+02]. In both cases, we added manually a defi-
nition of private location (the number of sugars ordered, and the identity of the
process entering the critical section, respectively), and we verified whether they
are opaque w.r.t. these internal behaviors.
We also applied our approach to a set of Java programs from the aforemen-
tioned STAC library. We use identifiers of the form STAC:1:n where 1 denotes
the identifier in the library, while n (resp. v) denotes non-vulnerable (resp. vul-
nerable). We manually translated these programs to parametric timed automata,
following the method described in Section 8.2. We used a representative set of
programs from the library; however, some of them were too complex to fit in our
framework, notably when the timing leaks come from calls to external libraries
(STAC:15:v), when dealing with complex computations such as operations on
matrices (STAC:16:v) or when handling probabilities (STAC:18:v). Proposing
efficient and accurate ways to represent arbitrary programs into (parametric)
timed automata is orthogonal to our work, and is the object of future works.
Timed-opacity computation First, we verified whether a given TA model is
opaque, i. e., if for all execution times reaching a given final location, both an
execution passes by a given private location and an execution does not pass by
this private location. To this end, we also answer the timed-opacity computation
problem, i. e., to synthesize all execution times for which the system is opaque.
While this problem can be verified on the region graph (Proposition 1), we use
the same framework as in Section 7, but without parameters in the original
TA. That is, we use the Boolean flag b and the parameter pabs to compute all
possible execution times. In other words, we use a parametric analysis to solve
a non-parametric problem.
We tabulate the experiments results in Table 1. We give from left to right
the model name, the numbers of automata and of clocks in the original timed
automaton (this information is not relevant for Java programs as the original
model is not a TA), the numbers of automata, of clocks and of parameters in
the transformed PTA, the computation time in seconds (for the timed-opacity
computation problem), and the result. In the result column, “×” (resp. “√”)
denotes that the model is opaque (resp. is not opaque), while “(
√
)” denotes that
the model is not opaque, but could be fixed. That is, although DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) 6=
DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ), their intersection is non-empty and therefore, by tuning the
computation time, it may be possible to make the system opaque. This will be
discussed in Section 8.5.
Even though we are interested here in timed opacity computation (and not
in synthesis), note that all models derived from Java programs feature the pa-
rameter ǫ. The result is obtained by variable elimination, i. e., by existential
quantification over the parameters different from pabs . In addition, the number
of parameters is increased by the parameters encoding the symbolic variables
(such as x and secret in Fig. 3).
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Table 1: Experiments: timed opacity
Model Transf. PTA Result
Name |A| |X| |A| |X| |P| Time (s) Vulnerable?
[VNN18, Fig. 5] 1 1 2 3 3 0.02 (
√
)
[GMR07, Fig. 1b] 1 1 2 3 1 0.04 (
√
)
[GMR07, Fig. 2a] 1 1 2 3 1 0.05 (
√
)
[GMR07, Fig. 2b] 1 1 2 3 1 0.02 (
√
)
Web privacy problem [Ben+15a] 1 2 2 4 1 0.07 (
√
)
Coffee 1 2 2 5 1 0.05 ×
Fischer-HSRV02 3 2 6 5 1 5.83 (
√
)
STAC:1:n 2 3 6 0.12 (
√
)
STAC:1:v 2 3 6 0.11
√
STAC:3:n 2 3 8 0.72 ×
STAC:3:v 2 3 8 0.74 (
√
)
STAC:4:n 2 3 8 6.40
√
STAC:4:v 2 3 8 265.52
√
STAC:5:n 2 3 6 0.24 ×
STAC:11A:v 2 3 8 47.77 (
√
)
STAC:11B:v 2 3 8 59.35 (
√
)
STAC:12c:v 2 3 8 18.44
√
STAC:12e:n 2 3 8 0.58
√
STAC:12e:v 2 3 8 1.10 (
√
)
STAC:14:n 2 3 8 22.34 (
√
)
Discussion Overall, our method is able to answer the timed-opacity computa-
tion problem relatively fast, exhibiting which execution times are opaque (timed-
opacity computation problem), and whether all execution times indeed guaran-
tee opacity (timed-opacity problem).
In many cases, while the system is not opaque, we are able to infer the
execution times guaranteeing opacity (cells marked “(
√
)”). This is an advantage
of our method w.r.t. methods outputting only binary answers.
We observed some mismatches in the Java programs, i. e., some programs
marked n (non-vulnerable) in the library are actually vulnerable according to
our method. This mainly comes from the fact that the STAC library uses some
statistical analyses on the execution times, while we use an exact method. There-
fore, a very small mismatch between DReach
v(A)
ℓpriv
(ℓf ) and DReach
v(A)
¬ℓpriv
(ℓf ) will
lead our algorithm to answer “not opaque”, while statistical methods may not
be able to differentiate this mismatch from noise. This is notably the case of
STAC:14:n where some action lasts either 5,010,000 or 5,000,000 time units de-
pending on some secret, which our method detects to be different, while the
library does not. For STAC:1:n, using our data, the difference in the execution
time upper bound between an execution performing some secret action and an
execution not performing it is larger than 1%, which we believe is a value which
is not negligible, and therefore this case study might be considered as vulner-
able. For STAC:4:n, we used a different definition of opacity (whether the user
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has input the correct password, vs. information on the real password), which
explains the mismatch.
Concerning the Java programs, we decided to keep the most abstract rep-
resentation, by imposing that each instruction lasts for a time in [0, ǫ], with ǫ
a parameter. However, fixing an identical (parametric) time ǫ for all instruc-
tions, or fixing an arbitrary time in a constant interval [0, ǫ] (for some constant
ǫ, e. g., 1), or even fixing an identical (constant) time ǫ (e. g., 1) for all instruc-
tions, significantly speeds up the analysis. These choices can be made for larger
models.
Timed opacity synthesis Then, we address the timed-opacity synthesis prob-
lem. In this case, we synthesize both the execution time and the internal values
of the parameters for which one cannot deduce private information from the
execution time.
We consider the same case studies as for timed-opacity computation; however,
the Java programs feature no internal “parameter” and cannot be used here.
Still, we artificially enriched one of them (STAC:3:v) as follows: in addition to
the parametric value of ǫ and the execution time, we parameterized one of the
sleep timers. The resulting constraint can help designers to refine this latter
value to ensure opacity.
We tabulate the results in Table 2, where the columns are similar to Table 1.
A difference is that the first |P| column denotes the number of parameters in
the original model (without counting these added by our transformation). In
addition, Table 2 does not contain a “vulnerable?” column as we synthesize the
condition for which the model is non-vulnerable, and therefore the answer is non-
binary. However, in the last column (“Constraint”), we make explicit whether
no valuations ensure opacity (“⊥”), all of them (“⊤”), or some of them (“K”).
Discussion An interesting outcome is that the computation time is compara-
ble to the (non-parametric) timed-opacity computation, with an increase of up
to 20% only. In addition, for all case studies, we exhibit at least some valuations
for which the system can be made opaque. Also note that our method always
terminates for these models, and therefore the result exhibited is complete. In-
terestingly, Coffee is opaque for any valuation of the 3 internal parameters.
8.5 “Repairing” a non-opaque PTA
Our method gives a result in time of a union of polyhedra over the internal
timing parameters and the execution time. On the one hand, we believe tun-
ing the internal timing parameters should be easy: for a program, an internal
timing parameter can be the duration of a sleep, for example. On the other
hand, tuning the execution time of a program may be more subtle. A solution
is to enforce a minimal execution time by adding a second thread in parallel
with a Wait() primitive to ensure a minimal execution time. Ensuring a max-
imal execution time can be achieved with an exception stopping the program
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Table 2: Experiments: timed opacity synthesis
Model Transf. PTA Result
Name |A| |X| |P| |A| |X| |P| Time (s) Constraint
[VNN18, Fig. 5] 1 1 0 2 3 4 0.02 K
[GMR07, Fig. 1b] 1 1 0 2 3 3 0.03 K
[GMR07, Fig. 2] 1 1 0 2 3 3 0.05 K
Web privacy problem [Ben+15a] 1 2 2 2 4 3 0.07 K
Coffee 1 2 3 2 5 4 0.10 ⊤
Fischer-HSRV02 3 2 2 6 5 3 7.53 K
STAC:3:v 2 2 3 9 0.93 K
after a given time; however there is a priori no guarantee that the result of the
computation is correct.
9 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an approach based on parametric timed model check-
ing to not only decide whether the model of a timed system can be subject to
timing information leakage, but also to synthesize internal timing parameters
and execution times that render the system opaque. We implemented our ap-
proach in a framework based on IMITATOR, and performed experiments on case
studies from the literature and from a library of Java programs.
We now discuss future works in the following.
Theory We proved decidability of the timed-opacity computation problem for
TAs, but we only provided an upper bound (EXPSPACE) on the complexity.
It can be easily shown that this problem is at least PSPACE, but the exact
complexity remains to be exhibited.
In addition, the decidability of the one-clock case remains open: that is, is
the timed-opacity emptiness problem decidable for PTAs containing a single
clock? Our method consists in duplicating the automaton and adding a clock
that is never reset, thus resulting in a PTA with 3 clocks, for which reachability-
emptiness is undecidable [AHV93]. However, since one of the clocks is never
reset, and since the automaton is structurally constrained (it is the result of
the composition of two copies of the same automaton), decidability might be
envisioned.
Finally, while we proved for the class of L/U-PTAs the decidability of the
timed-opacity emptiness problem, i. e., the non-existence of a valuation for which
the system is opaque, our result does not necessarily mean that exact (complete)
synthesis is possible. In fact, some results for L/U-PTAs were proved to be such
that the emptiness is decidable but the synthesis is intractable: that is notably
the case of reachability-emptiness, which is decidable [Hun+02] while synthesis
is intractable [JLR15]. Therefore, studying the timed-opacity synthesis problem
remains to be done for L/U-PTAs.
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Applications The translation of the STAC library required some non-trivial cre-
ativity: while the translation from programs to quantitative extensions of au-
tomata is orthogonal to our work, proposing automated translations of (possibly
annotated) programs to timed automata dedicated to timing analysis is on our
agenda.
Adding probabilities to our framework will be interesting, helping to quantify
the execution times of “untimed” instructions in program with a finer grain than
an interval; also note that some benchmarks make use of probabilities (notably
STAC:18:v).
Finally, IMITATOR is a general model checker, not specifically aimed at solv-
ing the problem we address here. Notably, constraints managed by PPL contain
all variables (clocks, timing parameters, and parameters encoding symbolic vari-
ables of programs), yielding an exponential complexity. Separating certain types
of independent variables (typically parameters encoding symbolic variables of
programs, and other variables) should highly increase efficiency.
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A The code of the Java example
1 import java . i o . Buf feredReader ;
2 import java . i o . IOException ;
3 import java . i o . InputStreamReader ;
4 import java . i o . Pr intWri te r ;
5 import java . net . Se rve rSocket ;
6 import java . net . Socket ;
7
8 // Co e f f i c i e n t s are Disregarded
9 pub l i c c l a s s Category1 vu lne rab le {
10 p r i va t e s t a t i c f i n a l i n t port = 8000 ;
11 p r i va t e s t a t i c f i n a l i n t s e c r e t = 1234 ;
12 p r i va t e s t a t i c f i n a l i n t n = 32 ;
13 p r i va t e s t a t i c Se rve rSocket s e rv e r ;
14
15 p r i va t e s t a t i c void checkSec re t ( i n t guess ) throws
Inte r ruptedExcept ion {
16 i f ( guess <= s e c r e t ) {
17 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
18 f o r ( i n t t = 0 ; t < n ; t++) {
19 Thread . s l e e p (1 ) ;
20 }
21 }
22 } e l s e {
23 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
24 f o r ( i n t t = 0 ; t < n ; t++) {
25 Thread . s l e e p (2 ) ;
26 }
27 }
28 }
29 }
30
31 p r i va t e s t a t i c void s t a r t S e rv e r ( ) {
32 t ry {
33 s e rv e r = new Serve rSocket ( port ) ;
34 System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” Serve r Started Port : ” + port ) ;
35 Socket c l i e n t ;
36 PrintWri te r out ;
37 BufferedReader in ;
38 S t r i ng use r Input ;
39 i n t guess ;
40 whi l e ( t rue ) {
41 c l i e n t = se rve r . accept ( ) ;
42 out = new Pr intWri te r ( c l i e n t . getOutputStream( ) , t rue ) ;
43 in = new BufferedReader (new InputStreamReader( c l i e n t .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
44
45 use r Input = in . readLine ( ) ;
46 t ry {
47 guess = In t e ge r . pa r s e In t ( use r Input ) ;
48 i f ( guess < 0) {
49 throw new I l l ega lArgumentException ( ) ;
50 }
51 checkSec re t ( guess ) ;
52 out . p r i n t l n ( ” Proce ss Complete” ) ;
53 } catch ( I l l ega lArgumentExcept ion | Inte r ruptedExcept ion
e ) {
54 out . p r i n t l n ( ”Unable to Proce ss Input ” ) ;
55 }
56 c l i e n t . shutdownOutput ( ) ;
57 c l i e n t . shutdownInput ( ) ;
58 c l i e n t . c l o s e ( ) ;
59 }
60 } catch ( IOException e ) {
61 System . ex i t (−1) ;
62 }
29
63 }
64
65 pub l i c s t a t i c void main ( S t r i ng [ ] args ) throws Inte r ruptedExcept ion {
66 s t a r t S e r v e r ( ) ;
67 }
68 }
30
